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ABSTRACT
Within OSNs, many of our supposedly online friendsmay instead be
fake accounts called social bots, part of large groups that purposely
re-share targeted content. Here, we study retweeting behaviors on
Twitter, with the ultimate goal of detecting retweeting social bots.
We collect a dataset of 10M retweets. We design a novel visualiza-
tion that we leverage to highlight benign and malicious patterns
of retweeting activity. In this way, we uncover a “normal” retweet-
ing pattern that is peculiar of human-operated accounts, and 3
suspicious patterns related to bot activities. Then, we propose a
bot detection technique that stems from the previous exploration
of retweeting behaviors. Our technique, called Retweet-Buster
(RTbust), leverages unsupervised feature extraction and cluster-
ing. An LSTM autoencoder converts the retweet time series into
compact and informative latent feature vectors, which are then
clustered with a hierarchical density-based algorithm. Accounts
belonging to large clusters characterized by malicious retweeting
patterns are labeled as bots. RTbust obtains excellent detection
results, with F1 = 0.87, whereas competitors achieve F1 ≤ 0.76.
Finally, we apply RTbust to a large dataset of retweets, uncovering
2 previously unknown active botnets with hundreds of accounts.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In 2016 the Oxford dictionary elected "Post-Truth" as the word
of the year and in 2017 Collins dictionary did the same for "Fake
News". In 2017 the World Economic Forum raised a warning on the
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potential distortion effect of social media on user perceptions of
reality1. Recent studies, targeting Facebook, showed the tendency
of the users to interact with information adhering to their preferred
narrative [3, 14] and to ignore dissenting information [49]. Confir-
mation bias seems to account for user decisions about consuming
and spreading content and at the same time, aggregation of favored
information within those communities reinforces selective expo-
sure and group polarization [39, 43]. As we interact with our peers,
we are exposed to the effects of echo chambers, which may result in
polarization and hate speech [15]. In this scenario the role of bots is
not clear, both for the difficulties in quantifying their impact as well
as for the accuracy of detection algorithms. However, any of our
supposedly online friends may instead be fake, automated accounts
(social bots), and a part of large coordinated groups that purposely
(re-)share targeted content [17]. Along this challenge, in this work
we propose a new method for the detection of groups of bots, ac-
counting for their statistical traces induced by their coordinated
behavior on Twitter.
Specifically, we focus on re-sharing (i.e., retweeting) patterns
with the ultimate goal of detecting retweeting social bots. Indeed,
by artificially boosting retweet counts, these bots may affect users’
popularity or influence, thus “reshaping political debates [4, 41].
They can defraud businesses and ruin reputations"2. Moreover, large
retweet counts indicate influential users, and can be monetized.
Thus, there are strong economic and sociopolitical incentives for
malicious bots to tamper with retweets [19, 42]. Hence, fast and
accurate removal of these bots might be crucial for ensuring the
healthiness of our online social ecosystems.
Both researchers and OSN administrators have recently been
very active towards the detection of social bots, and many different
techniques have been proposed to this end. Unfortunately, the same
also applies to malicious bot developers. In fact, as soon as new
detection techniques are deployed, bot developers tweak the charac-
teristics of their accounts, thus allowing them to evade detection [9].
This “never-ending clash” led to the current situation where so-
cial bots are so sophisticatedly engineered as to mimic legitimate
accounts, becoming almost indistinguishable from them [44]. A
straightforward consequence of this situation is that standard ma-
chine learning classification approaches, where each account is
analyzed individually, are no longer profitable. Instead, the scien-
tific frontier of bot detection now focuses on groups of suspicious
accounts as a whole. Analyzing groups has the advantage that,
1http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2017/acknowledgements/
2https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/27/technology/social-media-bots.html
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no matter how sophisticated a single bot can be, a large enough
group of them will still leave traces of automation, since they do
share a common goal (e.g., increasing someone’s popularity) [9].
For the same reasons, unsupervised approaches are preferred over
supervised ones [47].
The possibility to exploit more data for the analysis, opened
up by the approaches that target groups rather than individual ac-
counts, is however counterbalanced by the difficulties in collecting
and processing that much data. For instance, the behavior-based
technique described in [8, 10] requires collecting and comparing
data of the Twitter timelines of all analyzed accounts. Similarly,
graph-based techniques such as [27, 48] require building and ana-
lyzing the social graph of a large group of accounts. The amount of
data and computational power needed to complete these analyses,
inevitably limits the large-scale applicability of these techniques. In
short, the next generation of bot detection techniques should strike
the balance between accuracy and data/algorithmic efficiency.
Contributions.We propose a novel technique for the detection
of retweeting social bots, called Retweet-Buster (RTbust), hav-
ing all the desirable features previously discussed. Our technique
only requires the timestamps of retweets (and of the retweeted
tweets) for each analyzed account, thus avoiding the need for full
user timelines or social graphs. Then, it compares the temporal
patterns of retweeting activity of large groups of users. Leveraging
previous findings in the field, RTbust looks for groups of accounts
with distinctive and synchronized patterns. Evaluation results on a
large dataset of retweets demonstrate excellent bot detection per-
formances, with F1 = 0.87, whereas competitors achieve F1 ≤ 0.76.
Summarizing, our detailed contributions are as follows.
• We analyze retweeting behaviors of a large set of users by
introducing a simple – yet effective – visualization, which
we then leverage to highlight benign and malicious patterns
of retweeting activity.
• We design a group-analysis technique that is capable of
detecting accounts having the same retweeting patterns. Ac-
counts belonging to a large group characterized by the same
malicious patterns are labeled as bots.
• We compare detection results of our technique with those
obtained by baselines and other state-of-the-art techniques,
demonstrating the effectiveness of our approach.
• By applying our technique to a large dataset of retweets, we
uncover 2 previously unknown active botnets.
2 RELATEDWORK IN BOT DETECTION
The vast majority of previous attempts at bot detection are based on
supervised machine learning [9]. The first challenge in developing
a supervised detector is related to the availability of a ground truth
(i.e., labeled) dataset, to be used in the learning phase of the classifier.
In most cases, a real ground truth is lacking and the labels are simply
given by human operators that manually analyze the data. Critical
issues arise since there is no “standard” definition of what a social
bot is [35, 47]. Moreover, humans have been proven to largely
fail at spotting sophisticated bots, with only ≃ 24% bots correctly
labeled as such [9]. As anticipated, these criticalities support the
development of unsupervised techniques.
Regarding features to exploit for the detection, 3 classes have
been mainly considered: (i) profile features [13, 29, 46]; (ii) features
extracted from the posts, such as posting behavior and content
of posted messages [6, 31, 37]; and (iii) features derived from the
social or interaction graph of the accounts [27, 28, 32, 48]. The
classes of features exploited by the detection technique have a
strong impact on both the performances of the detector as well as
its efficiency [7]. For instance, in Twitter it has been demonstrated
that those features that mostly contribute towards the predictive
power of bot detectors (e.g., measures of centrality in the social
graph), are also the most costly ones.
The difficulties in detecting sophisticated bots with supervised
approaches that are based on the analysis of individual accounts,
recently gave rise to a new research trend that aims to analyze
groups of accounts as a whole [9]. This new approach to bot de-
tection is proving particularly effective at detecting coordinated
and synchronized bots, such as those targeted in our work. For
instance, the technique discussed in [8, 10] associates each account
to a sequence of characters that encodes its behavioral information.
Such sequences are then compared between one another to find
anomalous similarities among sequences of a subgroup of accounts.
The similarity is computed by measuring the longest common sub-
sequence shared by all the accounts of the group. Accounts that
share a suspiciously long subsequence are then labeled as bots. In-
stead, the family of systems described in [27, 32, 33] build a bipartite
graph of accounts and their interactions with content (e.g., retweets
to some other tweets) or with other accounts (e.g., becoming fol-
lowers of other accounts). Then, they aim to detect anomalously
dense blocks in the graph, which might be representative of coor-
dinated and synchronized attacks. A possible drawback of group
approaches is that they exacerbate challenges related to data and
algorithmic costs, since they typically involve a large number of
comparisons between all accounts in a given group [10, 45].
Lastly, a trailblazing direction of research involves the applica-
tion of adversarial machine learning to bot detection. Until now,
bot detection has mostly followed a reactive schema, where coun-
termeasures are taken only after having witnessed evidence of bot
mischiefs [44]. Instead, in [44] is proposed an adversarial framework
enabling proactive analyses. The framework has been later instanti-
ated in [11] by using evolutionary algorithms to test current detec-
tion techniques against a wider range of unseen, sophisticated bots.
Another preliminary work in adversarial bot detection is described
in [22]. Among the positive outcomes of adversarial approaches
to bot detection, is a more rapid understanding of the drawbacks
of current detectors and the opportunity to gain insights into new
features for achieving more robust and more reliable detectors.
3 DATA COLLECTION AND ANNOTATION
Our dataset for this study is composed of all Italian retweets shared
in a 2 weeks time span – specifically, between 17 and 30 June,
2018 (inclusive). Overall, our dataset comprises 9,989,819 retweets,
shared by 1,446,250 distinct users. Thus, on average, each user in
our dataset retweeted 7 times per day, in line with recent statistics
reporting between 2 and 50 daily retweets for legitimate users [18].
However, our dataset also includes many “extreme” users, as visible
in Figure 1 showing the distribution of retweets per day per user,
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Figure 3: Hourly volume of retweets across the
2 considered weeks.
which features a typical heavy-tailed shape. The 9,989,819 retweets
are related to 1,691,865 distinct original tweets, which are also
included in the dataset. Figure 2 shows the distribution of retweets
per original tweet, while Figure 3 shows the hourly volume of
retweets across the 2 considered weeks.
For each tweet, retweet, and user in our dataset we have access to
all Twitter metadata fields, as provided by Twitter APIs. To collect
this dataset, we resorted to Twitter Premium Search API3 with
the following query parameters4: lang:IT and is:retweet. Here,
the exploitation of the Premium Search API is important since
it allowed us to build a complete dataset of retweets. In fact, the
Standard Search API5 used in the majority of previous works, does
not guarantee completeness, meaning that not all tweets matching
the query criteria are returned. Notably, although our dataset for
this study is limited to tweets in the Italian language, both the
data collection approach and the analytical process described in
the remainder of the paper, are totally language independent. The
language of collected tweets can be easily changed with the lang:
parameter, and our analyses only exploit timestamps.
After data collection, we performed data filtering and annotation.
A manual inspection of those users exhibiting the largest number of
retweets per day quickly revealed their automated nature. However,
it turned out that all such accounts, despite being bots, were not
malicious ones. Their automated nature was manifest, they did not
try to disguise as human-operated accounts, and they were not
acting coordinatedly nor trying to inflate the popularity of some
specific content. The presence of this kind of bots is well known [20].
They do not pose a threat to OSNs and, in fact, some of them are
even benign [2, 40]. Thus, we excluded such accounts from future
analyses, since they are not the target of our work. Similarly, we
also excluded accounts featuring a very small number of retweets.
Operationally, we set our filtering thresholds by leveraging statistics
in [18] – that is, we retained only those users with amean number of
retweets per day ≥ 2 and ≤ 50. In this way, we ended up with 63,762
distinct users exhibiting human-like retweeting behaviors. The goal
of our next analyses is to tell apart the sophisticated human-like
bots from the real human-operated accounts.
Although our detection technique is unsupervised and hence it
does not require a labeled ground truth, we nonetheless carried out
manual annotation of a small subset of our dataset. This is useful
3https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/search/api-reference/premium-search.html
4https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/search/overview/premium#AvailableOperators
5https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/search/api-reference/get-search-tweets.html
in order to evaluate the extent to which our technique is capable of
correctly spotting the bots. We thus annotated ≃ 1, 000 accounts
from our dataset, following the latest annotation guidelines for
datasets containing social bots [9]. We ended up with an almost
balanced annotated dataset, comprising 51% bots and 49% legitimate
(i.e., human-operated) accounts.
4 PATTERNS OF RETWEETING ACTIVITY
Here, we investigate the temporal dynamics of retweeting activity
of all the 63,762 accounts in our dataset. By also leveraging class
labels of the annotated accounts, we aim at highlighting retweeting
behaviors that are indicative of normal versus suspicious activity.
To ease the exploration of a user’s retweeting activity, we pro-
pose a compact – yet informative – scatterplot visualization called
ReTweet-Tweet (RTT). Given a user and the list of all his retweets,
RTT plots the timestamp of each retweet (x axis) against the times-
tamp of the corresponding original tweet (y axis). By the definition
of RTT, points laying in different areas of the plot imply different
retweeting behaviors. Figure 4a shows the semantics of this visu-
alization, by means of a visual explanation of the most common
behaviors caught by the RTT plot. In detail, no point can ever ap-
pear above the main diagonal of the plot, since that would break
causality (i.e., it would correspond to a retweet that anticipates the
original tweet, which is clearly impossible). Points laying near to
the main diagonal represent retweets occurring rapidly after the
publication time of the original tweet. Conversely, points that lay
far from the diagonal imply a large temporal distance between a
tweet and its retweet (i.e., retweets of very old tweets), which is an
uncommon behavior.
Normal behaviors – droplet pattern. Figure 4b shows the
typical RTT plot of a “normal”, legitimate user. As shown, the vast
majority of points concentrates slightly below the main diagonal.
This is the expected behavior on the past-paced Twitter OSN, since
retweets typically occur with short delay (e.g., between 1 and 10
minutes) from the original tweets [21]. Occasionally, legitimate
users retweet a sequence of tweets with increasing delays. In RTT
plots, this retweeting behavior creates a few vertically-stacked
points that we refer to as droplets. We found this pattern to be
frequent among legitimate users. In fact, the droplet pattern occurs
each time a user retweets a Twitter feed (e.g., search results) or
a user timeline. Since feeds and timelines are rendered – both in
the Web application and via APIs – in reverse chronological order,
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(a) Semantics of RTT plots. (b) Droplet pattern. (c) Straight line pattern.
(d) Triangular pattern. (e) Waterfall pattern. (f) An extreme waterfall pattern.
Figure 4: RTT plots depicting a normal tweeting behavior (blue colored) and many suspicious ones (red colored). The insets of
RTT plots show the empirical probability density function (PDF) and a rug plot of retweet delays.
retweeting a sequence of such tweets results in increasing retweet
delays, just because tweets retweeted last are actually the oldest
ones. Apart from these observations, no other clear pattern emerges
in the RTT plot of Figure 4b. The possible presence of distinctive
patterns in RTT plots is particularly relevant since it implies some
form of regularity in a user’s retweeting activity. In turn, striking
regularities are typically caused by automated actions – that is, they
are representative of bot behaviors, as previous literature already
highlighted [6, 10, 32].
Suspicious behaviors – straight line pattern. The RTT plot
in Figure 4c shows different retweeting behaviors. Almost all points
in the plot are laying precisely above the main diagonal, meaning
that the user almost always retweets in a matter of a few seconds
from the original tweets. The user’s activity is also clearly split
into different sessions, separated by small gaps denoting inactivity.
Suspicious behaviors – triangular pattern. Figure 4d shows yet
another suspicious pattern. This time the activity sessions are very
regular, with always roughly the same length and the same inac-
tivity time that separates subsequent sessions. Moreover, sessions
seem to create a peculiar triangular pattern below the diagonal
of the RTT plot. This means that, within a given session, the user
retweets past tweets only up to a fixed point in time that roughly
corresponds to the starting time of the session.
Suspicious behaviors – waterfall pattern. Finally, Figure 4e
shows the behavior of a user whose retweets go way back in time.
In figure, this is represented by points forming solid vertical lines.
These lines are significantly longer than those representing droplets
in Figure 4b and are probably caused by systematic retweeting of a
Twitter feed or timeline in reverse chronological order. Since many
vertical lines are present in the RTT plots showing this retweeting
behavior, we call this a waterfall pattern. Apart from the vertical
lines, mild signs of retweeting sessions are also visible in the plot.
Although the presence of the waterfall pattern shown in Figure 4e
is already indicative of automated behaviors, for some users this
behavior is truly extreme, as shown in Figure 4f.
As highlighted by the previous analyses, the RTT plot is useful
for studying the retweeting behavior of a given user. It is a valuable
tool per se, that can empower human analysts for getting insights
into the behaviors of Twitter accounts. Moving forward, in the next
section we build on the results of these analyses by designing a
fully automatic technique for spotting malicious retweeting bots.
5 INTRODUCING RETWEET-BUSTER
As highlighted in the previous sections, unsupervised group-based
approaches currently represent the most promising research di-
rection for social bot detection [9, 47]. Thus, in this section we
propose an unsupervised technique that leverages the temporal
distribution of the retweets of large groups of users, in order to
detect malicious retweeting bots. Since we aim to design an unsu-
pervised technique, we can not simply learn a detector for spotting
the suspicious patterns identified in Section 4. Instead, our goal
is to develop a technique that is capable of spotting such suspi-
cious patterns, as well as possible other patterns that might exist in
a dataset describing temporal retweeting activities. In other words,
the technique should be able to automatically identify meaningful
patterns from the data, rather than be able to recognize only those
patterns that we manually labeled as suspicious.
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Figure 5: Main logical components of RTbust.
Thus, building on these considerations, we propose a retweeting
bot detection technique, called Retweet-Buster (RTbust), based
on automatic unsupervised feature extraction. Then, in order to
implement a group-analysis technique, such automatically-learned
features are passed to a density-based clustering algorithm. The
rationale for clustering stems from previous research in human and
bot behaviors, in that humans have been proven to exhibit much
more behavioral heterogeneity than automated accounts [6, 12]. As
a consequence, we expect that the heterogeneous humans will not
be sufficiently “dense” to be clustered. In fact, they will act pretty
much like a background noise in the features space. Conversely,
groups of coordinated and synchronized bots will be organized in
much denser groups in the features space, thus resulting in nice
density-based clusters. In detail, our proposed RTbust technique
is organized in 3 main steps, as also shown in Figure 5: (i) time
series data preparation and compression; (ii) unsupervised feature
extraction; and (iii) user clustering.
Data preparation and compression. Let tREF be a reference
timestamp set at the start of the analysis time window. In our case
tREF corresponds to 17 June, 2018 at 00:00:00. Then, t(x) denotes
the publication timestamp of tweet ID = x . The raw data exploited
to carry out bot detection with RTbust is the same used in the
RTT plots of Section 4, that is tweet and retweet timestamps. In
RTbust such timestamps are organized as a retweet time series
Ri = {ri,0, ri,1, . . . , ri,n } for each user ui , where,
ri, j =
{
|t(x) − tREF | if ui retweeted tweet ID = x at time tj
0 if ui did not retweet at time tj
The temporal granularity of our time series is that of seconds, which
is the same granularity as Twitter timestamps. That is, we have one
ri, j observation per second per user. Hence, our time series have
a very fine temporal grain. However, overall they are very sparse
because users retweet, on average, only once in a few minutes.
At this step, we want to maximize the informativeness of our
time series, while minimizing the amount of data to store and pro-
cess. To beat this trade off, we employ a modified version of the
run-length encoding (RLE) compression scheme. RLE is a simple
and widely-used lossless sequence compression scheme that en-
codes consecutive equal data values with one single <value, length>
tuple. In our case, we use RLE to reduce the sparsity in our time
ri,0 ri,1 · · · · · · ri,n
Ri = 3 0 0 0 4 0 6 9 · · · 20
3 -3 4 -1 6 9 · · · 20
Figure 6: Excerpt of a retweet time series compressed with
RLE. Observations affected by RLE are orange-colored.
series by compressing the many consecutive zeros that represent
no retweeting activity. Since we only need to compress zeros, we
do not need to use the typical RLE <value, length> tuples. In fact,
just the length will suffice. We have however to make a distinction
between RLE lengths and the |t(x) − tREF | observations that repre-
sent retweets. Since by definition, ri, j observations that represent
retweets are always positive, one straightforward way to make such
distinction is to substitute consecutive zeros with the opposite of
RLE lengths. Figure 6 graphically summarizes this data preparation
and compression step. As a result of this step, we have one single
compact time series for each user. Furthermore, such time series
efficiently encodes multiple information, such as inactivity periods
as well as tweets and retweets timestamps.
Unsupervised feature extraction. So far, we obtained a com-
pact representation of the temporal retweeting behaviors of our
users. Now, we need to turn this representation into a limited num-
ber of highly-informative features. Specifically, we have 3 goals for
this step: (i) obtain features for a subsequent machine learning task
(i.e., density-based clustering) in an unsupervised way; (ii) obtain
fixed-length feature vectors, whereas user time series have variable
length; (iii) maximize the amount of information in our features,
while minimizing the number of features.
Basically, all our goals can be achieved with a well thought
out application of dimensionality reduction techniques to our run-
length-encoded time series. Specifically, we take a feature projec-
tion approach, where we aim to transform our compressed time
series into lower-dimensional feature vectors. Feature projection
can be achieved via a large number of different techniques. Here, we
propose a solution based on variational autoencoders, a particular
type of deep neural networks, because of their favorable charac-
teristics [30]. In Section 6 we also show comparisons with other
dimensionality reduction and feature projection techniques (e.g.,
PCA, TICA).
Variational autoencoders (VAEs) are an unsupervised learning
technique that leverages neural networks for learning a probabilis-
tic representation (i.e., learning features) of the input. As shown in
Figure 5, a VAE is composed of 2 main modules: an encoder network
and a decoder network. The encoder takes the original input and
learns a compressed knowledge representation. Dually, the decoder
takes the compressed representation and tries to reconstruct the
original input at its best. During the (unsupervised) training phase
of the network, the encoder learns to create a meaningful and infor-
mative compressed representation of the input, so that the decoder
can accurately reconstruct it. Notably, if the input dimensions are
largely independent of one another, the compression performed by
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the encoder results in a loss of valuable information and the sub-
sequent reconstruction becomes a very difficult task. However, if
some sort of structure (i.e., patterns) exists in the input data, such as
the peculiar patterns that we uncovered in Section 4, that structure
can be learned by the encoder and consequently leveraged when
converting the input into its compressed representation. In other
words, this encoding learns latent features of the input data, which
is precisely what we require from this unsupervised feature extrac-
tion step. Because deep neural networks are capable of learning
nonlinear relationships, this encoding can be thought of as a more
powerful generalization of PCA [36]. In our work, the decoder is
only used for training the VAE, since we are not really interested in
reconstructing our time series. Instead, once trained, the encoder
becomes our unsupervised feature extractor. The dimension of the
latent feature vector generated by the encoder is a parameter of the
VAE, with which we extensively experiment in the next section. The
lower the dimension, the more compressed is the representation
of the input. However, a low-dimensional representation mitigates
possible issues during the subsequent clustering step, caused by
the curse of dimensionality [16].
Regarding the deep learning architecture used for implementing
the VAE, we relied on a long short-term memory (LSTM) network.
LSTMs are well-known and widely used recurrent neural networks.
Because of their memory states, they are well-suited for performing
tasks on time series, which are often characterized by temporal
correlations and by lags of unknown duration between relevant
events [24]. Specifically, LSTMs have been proven very accurate
at extracting patterns in input space, where input data spans over
long sequences. Furthermore, they are also suitable for dealing with
sequences of variable length, such as our time series, while still
being able to produce fixed-lengths data representations.
User clustering. Now that our users are represented by their
latent feature vectors computed by the LSTM encoder, we can apply
density-based clustering in order to check for common retweet-
ing behaviors. If large clusters of users are found, then we might
have detected a coordinated and synchronized group of accounts,
possibly constituting a retweeting botnet. We base our clustering
step on a recent efficient algorithm that combines density- and
hierarchical-based clustering: HDBSCAN [5]. Among the advan-
tages of this algorithm is its effectiveness in finding clusters with
variable degrees of density, a much desirable feature when dealing
with noisy real-world data. In addition, HDBSCAN also proved
about twice as fast as its predecessor DBSCAN. Regarding algo-
rithm parameters, HDBSCAN removed the need to specify a global
density threshold (the ϵ parameter in DBSCAN) by employing an
optimization strategy for finding the best cluster stability [5]. The
only mandatory parameter to set is the minimum cardinality of the
clusters found by HDBSCAN. We experiment with this parameter
in the next section. Concluding, after running our density-based
clusering step, we label as bots all those accounts that end up clus-
tered. Conversely, we label as legitimate all those account that are
treated as noise (i.e., that are not clustered) by HDBSCAN.
6 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
Here we present results obtained while searching for the best set
of parameters of RTbust, as well as overall bot detection results.
feature description
1 RT users entropy Shannon entropy of the distribution of
retweeted users
2 RT days entropy Shannon entropy of the distribution of the
publication days of retweeted tweets
3 RT rate number of retweets per time unit
4 daily mean RTs daily mean of the number of retweets
5 RT days number of distinct days duringwhich the user
retweeted at least once
6 minimum IRT minimum of the inter-retweet times
7 mean IRT mean of the inter-retweet times
8 stdev IRT standard deviation of the inter-retweet times
9 minimum RT delay minimum of the retweet delays
10 mean RT delay mean of the retweet delays
11 stdev RT delay standard deviation of the retweet delays
12 RT sessions number of detected retweeting sessions
Table 1: List of handcrafted features computed for each user.
Evaluation methodology. In all the experiments described in
this section we analyze all 63,762 accounts of our dataset. Then, we
evaluate the effectiveness of different techniques, possibly executed
with different configurations of parameters, in correctly classifying
the ≃ 1, 000 annotated accounts. Thus, the bot detection task is
framed as a binary classification task, with the 2 classes being: bot
(positive class) and human (negative class). For presenting evalu-
ation results we rely on 5 standard, well-known metrics used for
evaluating binary machine learning classifiers, specifically: pre-
cision, recall, accuracy, F1-Score (F1), and Matthews correlation
coefficient (MCC) [38].
Comparisons.While evaluating the bot detection results of RT-
bust, we also perform extensive comparisons with other baselines
and state-of-the-art techniques for social bot detection.
In Section 5 we grounded the unsupervised feature extraction
step of RTbust on a variational autoencoder. However, a number
of other techniques could be used to achieve the same goal. Thus,
for the sake of experimentation we implemented 2 more versions
of RTbust that are based respectively on principal component
analysis (PCA) and time independent component analysis (TICA)
for feature extraction [26]. PCA is a well-known linear statistical
technique for dimensionality reduction. By choosing an appropriate
number of principal components found by PCA, it is possible to
greatly reduce the dimensionality of a problem, while minimizing
the loss of information. Similarly, TICA is another dimensionality
reduction technique that is particularly suitable for dealing with
time series. While PCA finds high-variance linear combinations
of the input dimensions, TICA aims to find high-autocorrelation
linear combinations. Thus, when using PCA and TICA for feature
extraction, the features resulting from PCA are likely to convey
different information with respect to those obtained from TICA.
As typically done for many machine learning tasks, we also
experiment with a small set of handcrafted features. These features
take into account characteristics of the retweet time series of the
users (e.g., inter-retweet times, retweeting delays and sessions), as
well as other characteristics not available from retweet time series,
but that might still contribute to bot detection (e.g., the distribution
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Figure 7: Dependence of clustering stability and bot detec-
tion performances on the number of features extracted by
PCA, TICA and the VAE. Best results are obtained with the
VAE, starting from 8 features (dashed vertical line).
of retweeted accounts). Table 1 lists the 12 handcrafted features.
Notably, some of them – such as inter-retweet times – have been
largely used in previous retweeter bot detection systems [25, 45]. In
our subsequent experiments, these handcrafted features are tested
in RTbust in place of those automatically extracted by PCA, TICA,
and the VAE.
Regarding comparisons with other state-of-the-art bot detection
techniques, we experiment with the supervised version of the Social
fingerprinting technique proposed in [8, 10] and with the unsuper-
vised HoloScope technique proposed in [32]. Both techniques are
designed to detect synchronized and coordinated groups of bots,
and have been briefly described in Section 2. In addition, we also
experiment with the Botometer system [13]. Botometer is a publicly-
available service6 to evaluate the similarity of a Twitter account
with the known characteristics of social bots. It leverages an off-
the-shelf supervised machine learning classifier that exploits more
than 1,000 features of the accounts under investigation. Similarly
to the majority of existing systems, Botometer performs account-
by-account analyses, rather than group analyses.
Finally, as a simple comparison baseline we also try classifying
as bots all those accounts whose retweet rate (i.e., retweets per unit
of time) is higher than a fixed threshold. We set this threshold as
the third quartile of the distribution of retweet rates for our 63,762
accounts. This comparison helps understand if simply looking at
the number of retweets is enough for gaining insights into the
nature (bot/legitimate) of an account.
Parameters configuration. The most important parameter of
RTbust is the dimension of the latent feature vectors generated
by the VAE. It affects both the quality of the subsequent clustering
step, which in turn affects bot detection performances, as well as
the time/computation needed to complete it. The same also applies
to the number of projected dimensions obtained with PCA or TICA.
Thus, we designed an experiment to evaluate the performances
of RTbust, implemented with VAE, PCA, and TICA for feature
extraction, in relation to the number of considered latent features.
Figure 7 shows results for this experiment, in terms of the overall
F1 obtained for the classification of bots and humans, and of the to-
tal number of clusters found by HDBSCAN. Regarding the number
6https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu
of clusters, all 3 implementations show the same qualitative behav-
ior.When considering a very limited number of features, HDBSCAN
finds a large number of clusters. Increasing the number of features
results in fewer clusters, up to a point (size of latent feature vector
= 10) where the number of clusters stops decreasing. Regarding bot
detection performance, Figure 7 shows a very different behavior
between the VAE implementation of RTbust, with respect to the
PCA and TICA ones. Features extracted by PCA and TICA seem
to provide significantly less information for bot detection with re-
spect to those extracted by the VAE, as demonstrated by a lower
F1. Moreover, increasing the number of considered PCA and TICA
features seems of no help, since the F1 remains almost the same for
each latent feature vector size. Instead, the VAE implementation
shows a behavior that is consistent with the results obtained for the
number of clusters. The F1 rapidly increases when considering a
larger number of features, up to a point (size of latent feature vector
= 8) where it reaches and maintains its maximum (apart from a few
fluctuations). Overall, these results demonstrate that the VAE is
much more powerful than PCA and TICA for the unsupervised fea-
ture extraction from our retweet time series. Furthermore, as little
as 8 VAE features seem to be enough for stabilizing the clustering
and achieving good bot detection results.
We repeated this experiment by also varying the minimum clus-
ter cardinality (i.e., the only HDBSCAN parameter). We omit de-
tailed results due to space limitations, however we report finding
the best results with clusters larger than 10 accounts, a threshold
that is both intuitive (i.e., it is not very meaningful to look for
minuscule botnets) and operationally effective.
Quantitative evaluation of bot detection. Next, we present
detailed bot detection results for all the considered techniques. For
the VAE, PCA and TICA implementations of RTbust, we use only
8 features, leveraging results of our previous experiment.
Table 2 shows retweeter bot detection results. The best detection
performances (F1 = 0.87) are achieved by the proposed RTbust
technique using the VAE for unsupervised feature extraction. In
fact, it beats all other competitors in each evaluation metric, with
the only exception of the recall metric. All other implementations
of RTbust achieve worse results, with F1 ≤ 0.67. As anticipated,
this is a strong point in favor of the VAE for extracting informa-
tive features from our retweet time series. The second best overall
results are obtained by the Social fingerprinting, achieving an en-
couraging F1 = 0.76. Instead, the other state-of-the-art techniques
obtain much worse results, with Botometer’s F1 = 0.43 and Holo-
Scope’s F1 = 0.01. Interestingly, the majority of evaluated tech-
niques achieve their worst results in the precision metric, meaning
that many legitimate accounts are misclassified as bots. This results
is in contrast with previous results in bot detection [9]. However,
previous works mainly experimented with supervised techniques,
while here we mainly explore unsupervised ones. Thus, combined
results of our study and previous ones might suggest that super-
vised approaches to social bot detection are more prone to type II
errors (false negatives), while unsupervised approaches are more
prone to type I errors (false positives).
In Figure 8, we use t-SNE [34] for plotting our annotated accounts
in a bi-dimensional space, where each account is colored according
to the RTbust (VAE) cluster it belongs to, and 2 different symbols
represent bots and legitimate accounts according to our ground
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evaluation metrics
technique type features precision recall accuracy F 1 MCC
baseline
retweet rate – 1 0.3534 0.3585 0.3440 0.3559 −0.3124
comparisons
Botometer [13] supervised > 1, 000 0.6951 0.3098 0.5830 0.4286 0.2051
HoloScope [32] unsupervised – 0.2857 0.0049 0.4908 0.0096 −0.0410
Social fingerprinting [8, 10] supervised – 0.6562 0.8978 0.7114 0.7582 0.4536
our contributions
RTbust (handcrafted features) unsupervised 12 0.5284 0.7707 0.5364 0.6270 0.0767
RTbust (PCA) unsupervised 8 0.5111 0.9512 0.5154 0.6649 0.0446
RTbust (TICA) unsupervised 8 0.5228 0.9512 0.5364 0.6747 0.1168
RTbust (VAE) unsupervised 8 0.9304 0.8146 0.8755 0.8687 0.7572
Table 2: Retweeter bot detection results of RTbust and comparison with a baseline and other state-of-the-art techniques. Best
results in each evaluation metric are shown in bold.
Figure 8: Visual exploration of RTbust (VAE) bot detection
results, and comparison with t-SNE.
truth. Since in RTbust each clustered account is labeled as bot
while unclustered ones are labeled as humans, by comparing colors
and symbols of the accounts in figure, it is possible to visually
assess the quality of bot classification. Furthermore, Figure 8 also
allows a comparison between our clustering and that resulting
from t-SNE. Regarding bot detection, we can see few clustered
legitimate accounts. Similarly, only a minority of bots are grey-
colored (i.e., unclustered). Concerning the comparison between t-
SNE and RTbust, the 2 algorithms produce rather different clusters.
For instance, multiple RTbust clusters collapse in a single t-SNE
cluster and vice versa. However, the overall distinction between
bots and humans seem to hold for both RTbust and t-SNE. The
majority of legitimate accounts are both grey-colored and spread
across the central region of Figure 8. In other words, they do not
belong to any cluster neither for t-SNE nor for RTbust. Dually, the
majority of bots appear as colored and positioned near other bots.
Thus, both t-SNE and RTbust seem to recognize bot similarities
although organizing the bots differently, despite the very different
inner functioning of the 2 techniques. Given the usefulness and
widespread application of t-SNE, these similarities support results
of RTbust (VAE).
Qualitative evaluation of bot detection. Given the good re-
sults achieved by RTbust (VAE) at spotting the annotated bots in
(a) Cars botnet. (b) Singer botnet.
Figure 9: RTT plots of the 2 botnets discovered with RTbust.
Figure 10: A subset of accounts from the singer botnet.
our dataset, we now analyze also those non-annotated accounts
that have been labeled as bots by the same technique. This manual
and qualitative validation might serve as an additional evaluation
of the outcomes of RTbust.
In particular, RTbust found 2 notable clusters of non-annotated
accounts. The smallest of such clusters counts 44 accounts. A man-
ual inspection of these accounts revealed that they actually belong
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to a small botnet with some peculiar characteristics. First and fore-
most, they almost only retweet 3 accounts (@peugeotitalia, @cit-
roenitalia and@motorionline). Thus, this botnet has a specific focus
on cars. Moreover, they only post retweets or images, no account
of the botnet has a real profile picture, and they are loosely syn-
chronized, meaning that they tend to retweet the same tweets but
at different moments in time. In order to get further insights into
their behavior, we produced a combined RTT visualization of all the
accounts of the botnet, as shown in Figure 9a. Each point in figure is
a retweet made by one of the botnet’s account and colors represent
different bots. Interestingly, clear patterns emerge in some portions
of the RTT plot, as seen in the inset of Figure 9a. Such patterns
testify the synchronized retweeting activity of the botnet.
The other notable cluster of bot accounts found by RTbust is
composed of almost 300 accounts that almost exclusively retweet
2 accounts (@Valerio_Scanu and @ArmataScanu). Similarly to the
previous smaller botnet, also this larger one seems to retweet with
a specific focus – that is, publicizing tweets related to the Italian
pop singer Valerio Scanu7. Figure 9b shows the RTT plot of this
botnet, which exhibits a mixture of the triangular and waterfall
patterns that we described in Section 4. Figure 10 also displays the
appearance of the profiles of some of these accounts. As seen, some
accounts of the botnet are tightly synchronized, while the botnet
as a whole is loosely synchronized.
This qualitative evaluation revealed that, not only did RTbust
achieve good results on the annotated accounts, but it also allowed
to discover 2 previously unknown active retweeting botnets.
7 DISCUSSION
Visualizing suspicious behaviors. In this work we provided sev-
eral contributions. The first of such contributions is the develop-
ment of the RTT visualization. In figures 4 and 9 we showed that
RTT plots represent a useful tool for analyzing the retweeting be-
havior of an account, or of a group of accounts. Human analysts can
gain valuable insights into the behaviors of suspicious accounts by
leveraging RTT plots. The possibility to leverage RTT plots might
be particularly valuable in future data annotation tasks, consider-
ing the current difficulties faced by human annotators in correctly
labeling social bots [9]. Another favorable application scenario is
related to the banning of bots from OSNs. Indeed, despite the recent
advances in machine learning-based detectors, manual verification
of accounts to assess their degree of automation is still carried out
by OSN administrators [17]. To this end, RTT plots might contribute
to speed-up the process and to reduce possible human mistakes.
Notably, a few previous works also proposed some simple vi-
sualizations with the goal of highlighting suspicious behaviors in
OSNs [19, 27, 28]. However, previous visualizations for spotting sus-
picious behaviors require much more data than that needed by RTT
plots. For example, the visualizations used in [27] are based on the
full social graph of considered accounts. Similarly, the visualizations
proposed in [19] require building retweet threads/cascades, which
in turn require friend/followers information of each retweeter. Con-
versely, with RTT plots we can spot suspicious retweeting behaviors
with as little information as retweet-tweet timestamps.
7https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Valerio_Scanu
Generalizability and robustness. Our second, and largest,
contribution is the development of the Retweet-Buster (RTbust)
bot detection technique. RTbust is an unsupervised technique that
is capable of automatically spotting meaningful patterns in retweet
data. Because of this feature, RTbust is potentially capable of de-
tecting retweeting bots exhibiting a behavior that has not been
witnessed before. We believe this to be an important feature, con-
sidering that we still lack a “standard” and “well-agreed” definition
of what a social bot is [35, 47] – and consequently, of its expected
behaviors [1]. Hence, the capability to spot a broad set of differ-
ent behaviors, surely comes in handy. Moreover, it has been now
largely demonstrated that social bots do evolve to escape detection
techniques [9, 44]. Thus, the generalizability of RTbust and its
robustness to evasion is a much desirable feature because it allows
us to better withstand the next evolution of social bots.
Explainability.Model and decision explainability has now be-
come one of the major practical and ethical concerns around AI [23].
To this regard, one of the possible drawbacks of RTbust lies in the
difficulty to “explain” the reasons for labeling an account as bot or
legitimate. This is largely due to the difficulty in interpreting the
latent features used for clustering, which in turn depend on the
adoption of the “black-box” variational autoencoder for unsuper-
vised feature extraction. This issue is not peculiar of our technique,
but it is rather a well-known limitation of all deep learning tech-
niques [23]. Here, to mitigate this issue we again propose to resort
to RTT plots. As demonstrated in Figure 9, our visualization can be
profitably used also after the application of RTbust, with the goal
of understanding the characteristics of those accounts that have
been labeled as bots.
8 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we investigated patterns of retweeting activity on
Twitter, with the specific goal of detecting malicious retweeting
bots. To this end, our work provides several contributions.
Firstly, we proposed a novel visualization technique calledReTweet-
Tweet (RTT). As thoroughly shown, RTT plots are an effective and
efficient mean to gain valuable insights into the retweeting behav-
iors of Twitter accounts. By leveraging RTT plots we analyzed the
“normal” retweeting behavior of legitimate users, and we uncovered
3 suspicious behaviors that are caused by automated retweeting
– and thus, that are representative of bot activities. Furthermore,
we discussed how RTT plots can empower human analysts when
manually annotating a dataset comprising social bots, as well as
OSN administrators looking for evidence of automation when de-
ciding about banning accounts from social platforms. Finally, we
highlighted that RTT plots can also be used to explain decisions of
black-box bot detectors, thus contributing towards explainable and
interpretable AI.
Next, we designed an unsupervised group-analysis technique,
called Retweet-Buster (RTbust), for detecting retweeting social
bots. The core of RTbust is an LSTM variational autoencoder that
we trained to extract a minimum number of highly informative
latent features from the retweet time series of each account. The
decision about an account (whether it is bot or legitimate) is based
on the outcome of a hierarchical density-based clustering algorithm.
In detail, accounts belonging to large clusters are labeled as bots,
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while unclustered accounts are labeled as legitimate. We compared
different implementations of RTbust with baselines and state-of-
the-art social bot detection techniques. RTbust outperformed all
competitors achieving F1 = 0.87, in contrast with F1 ≤ 0.76 of
other techniques. By applying RTbust to a large dataset of retweets,
we also discovered 2 previously unknown active botnets comprising
hundreds of accounts.
For future work we plan to improve the decisions taken by RT-
bust. In fact, here we adopted a rather naive solution revolving
around accounts being clustered or not. However, we can augment
the final decision step of RTbust by considering additional infor-
mation, such as the hierarchy of clusters produced by the clustering
algorithm and other internal and external clustering validation mea-
sures. In this way, we could prune some clusters or some accounts
belonging to a cluster, thus improving precision. Similarly, we could
expand some clusters by adding borderline accounts, thus possibly
also improving recall, which currently is the bottleneck of RTbust.
Other than improving RTbust, we also plan to apply it in the wild
for discovering and analyzing active botnets.
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